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Abstract:  
 
This article explores the French government’s political and military relationship with Rwanda since 
1975, with a particular focus on the period from 1990 and throughout the genocide of 1994. An 
argument is made that the French state, through its behaviour in Rwanda before and during the 
genocide of 1994 is complicit under international criminal law. As a concept, complicity provides a 
lens for understanding the scope of liability of states as responsible actors within the international 
system. The article argues that that the knowing participatory role played by the French throughout 
the period of the Rwandan genocide, can be construed as complicity in genocide. This is a criminal 
breach of international law.   
 
 
“The more one looks, the more one finds examples in the 
recent history of genocide of minority groups whose fate 
hinges on their historic connection with Western, usually 
former imperial powers” 1 
 
Four years after the Rwandan genocide of 1994, the French Assembly issued a report on its 
investigations into the killings. In doing so, the main Rapporteur of the report confidently 
asserted that, in relation to genocide, ‘France is neither responsible nor guilty’2. This 
statement contradicted the actual evidence presented to the panel, but which was ignored. As 
the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) caustically noted, ‘[t]he [French Assembly] report’s 
evidence and the report’s findings seemed unrelated’3. In addition to such contradictions 
with the basic facts about the genocide, significant aspects of French involvement in Rwanda 
were omitted from the inquiry from the start. Foremost of these was an indicative picture of 
French military assistance to Rwanda throughout the 1990s until the end of the genocide of 
the Tutsi in 1994.  Such a portrayal would have provided a contextualisation of France’s 
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historic role in Rwanda. It would however, have meant that French denials of involvement in 
the 1994 tragedy were even less credible. 
This article utilises in-depth semi-structured interviews that the author conducted with 
genocide survivors 4,  Rwandan government officials, British government officials and former 
representatives to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The evidence presented 
demonstrates that the French government as a collective responsible entity is accountable and 
criminally responsible for its failure to act to prevent or stop the Rwandan genocide. This 
argument directly contradicts the French government’s refusal to acknowledge even its 
minimal role in the atrocities. The interviews were further supplemented with data drawn 
from interviews with ex- Forces Armees Rwandaise (FAR), former Interahamwe5, and genocide 
survivors screened at the Mucyo Commission6, in addition to biographies, official reports 
and newspapers. Analysis indicates that the knowing participatory role played by the French 
throughout the period of the Rwandan genocide can be construed as complicity in genocide, 
a criminal breach of international law. 
 
International Criminal Law and Complicity  
Central to any discussion on the law of genocide and the subject of this article is the 
International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(hereinafter Genocide Convention)7, which the United Nations adopted on December 9, 1948, 
and which entered into force on January 12, 1951. The Genocide Convention is an 
international treaty embraced by the realm of public international law, which draws on 
elements of international criminal law, international humanitarian law and international 
human rights law8. As the International Court of Justice noted in its 1951 advisory opinion, 
‘the principles underlying the Convention are principles which are recognized by civilized 
nations as binding on States, even without any conventional obligation’9.   
The jurisdiction of the Genocide Convention extends in Article III to include conspiracy 
to commit genocide, and complicity in genocide. These are classed as crimes under 
international law. The Genocide Convention is supplemented by later legal processes. The 
Statutes of both the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) contain two notable provisions on 
responsibility for genocide. These are 'complicity' in genocide and 'aiding and abetting 
genocide'. The prosecutor of the ICTY argued that ‘any assistance, even as little as being 
involved in the operation of one of the camps’, constitutes sufficient participation to meet the 
terms of complicity10.  
It must be underlined that negligence is incompatible with the specific intent 
requirement of genocide.11 As the ICTR observed in the Akayesu case12, an individual cannot 
be guilty as a participant in genocide ‘where he did not act knowingly, and even where he 
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should have had such knowledge’13. Schabas defines complicity in genocide as incriminating 
those who ‘aid, abet, counsel and procure, or otherwise participate in criminal offences’.14 
The proceedings of the ICTR in the case versus Akayesu have been interpreted as ‘aiding’ 
being defined as giving active assistance to someone, whilst ‘abetting’ involves facilitating 
the commission of an act by being sympathetic thereto.15 Following this, the concept of 
complicity in genocide has been developed in international jurisprudence to enable the 
prosecution of those who knowingly assist, aid, abet, procure or counsel genocide, but who 
never actually wielded the machetes, guns, or other tool of genocide and thus were not 
directly responsible for actual crimes. This notion of complicity can, it is argued, be extended 
beyond individuals to include corporate actors such as states. Such an argument springs from 
the growing literature on the notion of state crime.    
 
The concept of state crime  
Historically, criminal responsibility of the state is a concept that has been challenged by 
proponents of a strict reading of state sovereignty.16 Such a legal positivist position would 
argue that as it is states that make laws, states cannot—by definition—break the law. Such a 
tautological argument of course privileges the state (and its actors) above and beyond 
responsibility for their actions. This logic was questioned at the post-war Nuremburg Trials 
but lay in abeyance for decades during the Cold War as realpolitik triumphed.  However, an 
emerging consensus developed after the end of the Cold War and now can be said to exist 
that argues that states can commit crimes and that they should be held criminally responsible 
for such legal breaches. Whilst this consensus is largely academic thus far, state responsibility 
for international crimes can be said to be an emerging normative principle within 
international law.17 With this regard, the concept of states being responsible for breaches of 
international criminal law was formally adopted in Part I of the United Nations International 
Law Commission's Draft Articles on State Responsibility. 18 Indeed, the ICTR achieved several 
convictions on charges of complicity in genocide.19 However those precedents, without 
exception, involved complicity by individuals as opposed to complicity by states. 
Contraventions of Article III of the Genocide Convention have to date been levelled solely at 
individuals and although there is an affirmation within the Genocide Convention that states 
may not fail to act in the face of mass atrocities directed at the destruction of a particular 
group, no state has yet been held accountable in terms of the Genocide Convention. It is 
argued that this is logically incompatible with the accepted norm of complicity and that the 
role of the French in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda is a clear example of this. Why this is so, is 
discussed below.  
 The subject of direct responsibility of states for genocide, in addition to state 
responsibility should they fail to prevent or punish acts of genocide, was debated during the 
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conceptualisation phase of the Genocide Convention, when the United Kingdom proposed an 
amendment to Article V. The amendment stated that  ‘[c]riminal responsibility for any act of 
genocide as specified in Articles II and IV shall extend not only to all private persons or 
associations, but also to states, governments, or organs or authorities of the state or government, by 
whom such acts are committed’ [italics emphasised]. The amendment was however rejected,20 
and the ambiguous wording of Article IX, intimating the potential responsibility of a State for 
genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article III, continues to be the subject of 
much close examination and debate. Interestingly the International Court of Justice’s 
interpretation of Article IX of the Genocide Convention does not exclude any form of state 
responsibility. Nor was the responsibility of a state for acts of its organs excluded by Article 
IV of the Convention, which contemplates the commission of an act of genocide by 'rulers' or 
'public officials'. 21 This opens up the possibility of state complicity. 22 
 In 2001, the United Nations International Law Commission produced ‘Draft Articles on 
State Responsibility’ for intentionally wrongful acts, which were subsequently adopted and 
received by the United Nations General Assembly in 2001.23 Crawford et al argue that this is 
one of the most important topics that the Commission has undertaken.24 Article 19 of the said 
‘Draft Articles on State Responsibility’ recognized the possibility of genocide being 
committed by a state but that this would constitute a 'wrongful act', taking the form of a 
state's breach of a fundamental treaty obligation, as opposed to a criminal act. 25 However, of 
significance is that the said Articles were quite explicit in stipulating that wrongful acts by 
persons in authority may be attributed to the States they serve. Under Article 8, acts 
committed by individuals ‘shall be considered an act of State under international law if the 
person or groups of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or 
control of, that State in carrying out the conduct’ [emphasis added]26. In addition, Article 9 
adds that ‘the conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of State under 
international law if the person or group of persons is in fact exercising elements of 
governmental authority in the absence or default of the official authorities and in 
circumstances such as to call for the exercise of those elements of authority’27 [emphasis 
added]. The International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility thus lays 
bare the principle that the state that empowered actors can be held directly accountable for 
the acts of these empowered individuals. This normative principle is extremely important 
and having established the legal definition and parameters of state complicity, we now turn 
to the Rwandan case and the role of France.  
  
Franco-Rwandan relations  
Rwanda was first occupied by the Germans in the 1890s, thereafter by Belgium after the First 
World War (under a League of Nations mandate) and until independence in 1962. After the 
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Belgians withdrew from the country in 1962, their only interest in Rwanda was to nurture an 
economic relationship as opposed to political and military links, which were gradually 
assumed by Paris. Indeed, France effectively stepped in to take advantage of the cultural and 
linguistic roots already formed during Belgian rule, and Rwanda found itself being slowly 
incorporated into la Francophonie and Françafrique. This process accelerated as the 1970s 
unfolded.     
From the beginning of the presidency of Major General Juvenal Habyarimana in 1973 
(he assumed power via a coup d’etat), France assiduously courted Kigali and the Rwandan 
political elite. In 1975, a Franco-Rwandan military cooperation and training agreement was 
signed in Paris by Presidents Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and Habyarimana.28 The agreement 
stated that‘[t]he government of the French Republic places at the disposal of the government 
of the Rwandese republic the French military personnel whose services are required for the 
organisation and instruction of the Rwandese national police’ 29 The agreement was a classic 
example of the way in which France tied in African states to the broader French sphere of 
influence across the continent. ‘[D]espite an Organisation of African Unity  (OAU) resolution 
in 1978 condemning the existence of foreign military bases on the [African] continent',30 the 
French military persisted, maintaining 400 coopérant forces in Rwanda throughout the 1980s. 
Whilst African sensibilities rejected the idea of foreign militaries being stationed in and 
operating on a postcolonial Africa, individual states—particularly in Francophone Africa—
had lesser qualms. Such forces were a visible show of support by Paris for its clients and 
Habyarimana was no exception. Indeed, France acted as a visible guarantor for the regime 
and this continued up to and beyond 1994. The increasing institutionalisation of ethnicity and 
autocracy had no visible effect on France’s enthusiastic support for Kigali.  Indeed, it can be 
argued that this support actually helped facilitate Habyarimana’s project in making Rwanda 
one of the most controlled and restrictive non-communist states in the world.31 The 1978 
constitution in fact institutionalised an ethnically based one party state, Ethnic divisions were 
entrenched by this constitution in pre-genocide Rwanda which was wholly acceptable to the 
French.  
 In fact, under President François Mitterand (1981–1995), relations with the government 
of Juvenal Habyarimana intensified, with France increasingly playing a role in shaping 
Rwanda’s economic and social relations as well as its political power structures. Whilst the 
presidential campaign of Mitterrand had promoted a ‘new way’ in France’s view of the world 
and had presented an ostensible ethical foreign policy that ‘pledged to defend the rights of 
the oppressed people everywhere, champion a fairer system of international development 
and work for world disarmament’, very little practically changed in Franco-African relations. 
32 Interestingly, Mitterand portrayed himself as an ardent proponent of reducing France’s sale 
of armaments to Africa. Yet at the time of Mitterand’s inauguration in 1981, France was the 
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leading arms exporter per capita in the world and the French arms industry had no such 
ethical ambitions. Mitterrand’s policy of supporting the ‘poor and oppressed’ was short-lived 
and arms sales to regimes with questionable human rights records thrived.33 In fact, 
Mitterrand was to subsequently prove to be Rwanda’s closest military and political ally.  
 
French military intervention in Rwanda: Operation Noroît    
French military numbers in Rwanda soared as a result of Operation Noroît, a French 
operation launched in response to a request for assistance by President Habyarimana against 
a surprise RPF invasion from Uganda on 1 October 1990. The RPF attack was quickly 
repelled by FAR with the assistance of French military support and the RPF retreated, 
subsequently launching  a series of guerrilla incursions into Rwanda that were met with 
rapid retaliatory action by the Rwandan army, again ably assisted by the French. 
After the RPF defeat, Habyarimana’s regime reacted by staging indiscriminate attacks 
on Rwandan civilians and thereafter issuing press releases identifying RPF infiltrators as the 
perpetrators. This then provided a pretext for arresting numerous Tutsi civilians suspected of 
supporting the RPF. These detainees would be held without charge, thousands of them for 
months and in conditions where many were tortured and dozens died. 
 Since these events, it has been argued that the French military involvement in Operation 
Noroît was responsible for escalating the levels of Rwandan government brutality and 
‘encouraging further purchases of military hardware at the expense of basic necessities’ 
within the country.34 That this occurred under France’s watch is clear: according to Human 
Rights Watch, from the beginning of the outbreak of civil war in 1990, the French authorities 
were fully aware of the risk of genocide in Rwanda but did nothing.35 Whilst the ostensible 
purpose of Noroît was as a humanitarian mission to protect Europeans in danger, a 
clandestine element within the operation called Panda DAMI (Détachement d’Assistance 
Militaire et d’Instruction) provided direct support to the Rwandan army and was involved in 
combat versus the RPF.36 In short, Paris actively involved itself in an African civil war and 
chose sides. 
 After repelling the RPF’s October 1990 attack and thus the alleged threat to Europeans 
was over, the French troops of Operation Noroît remained in Rwanda. 37 This presence 
enabled French troops to become officially involved in organising and training members of 
FAR and the specially recruited Presidential Guard. Whilst this would be compatible with the 
treaty signed between Paris and Kigali, there is corroborated evidence that the French 
military were also responsible for actively training thousands of the civilian Hutu militiamen 
of the Interahamwe and the smaller Impuzamugambi. These individuals would later become the 
main perpetrators of the genocide. As the militia were party-aligned and non-governmental, 
there was no justification for the French military mission in Rwanda to be involved in 
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training such groups.  Paris was well aware of this. The Franco-Rwanda agreement of 1975, 
clearly specified that the French military were only legally permitted to organise and instruct 
the Rwandese national police.38 In order to legally cover French support for Habyarimana’s 
military, the 1975 Franco-Rwandan agreement was amended on 26 August 1992 to allow 
training of the Rwandese Armed Forces.39 But this amendment never legally permitted the 
French to train party militias.40 
A resident in Rwanda throughout the period 1990 – 1994, personally witnessed the 
French supply FAR with Panhard armoured cars, heavy artillery and some Gazelle 
helicopters.41 Indeed, a former soldier of FAR stated that ‘in 1990 the French came with the 
guns and taught us how to use them. The French soldiers went into battle with us, fighting 
the RPF, but it was only the French that fired the heavy guns.’42 Operation Noroît officially 
left Rwanda in December 1993. However a significant number of witnesses have affirmed  
that the French military remained in Rwanda covertly and continued military training up to 
and throughout the period of the genocide the following year43. 
During the period of Operation Noroît, French influence was not restricted to the 
physical coaching in target practice with firearms or even the art of strangulation and the 
construction of wooden clubs. In fact, the French also provided their students with 
ideological indoctrination infused with an eliminationist agenda directed against the Tutsi. 
France maintained a permanent diplomatic mission in Kigali during this time, allowing the 
embassy to keep abreast of the hate propaganda broadcast over the airwaves and printed in 
newspapers by the regime and extremist Hutu Power ideologues, as well as the persistent 
massacres committed by elements who would later became perpetrators of genocide.44 There 
is no evidence that France sought to rein in such pronouncements; to the contrary, there is 
ample confirmation that the French were involved in encouraging such discourses.   
A former Rwandan soldier has stated that ‘[t]he French soldiers would teach us that the 
Tutsi were our enemies and that we should kill them at any opportunity. The French taught 
us that if we allowed the Tutsi to return, they would take over our country. They would 
cause us to perish.’45 Another former Rwandan soldier has testified that the French told them 
‘your enemy is the Tutsi. As long as they are alive, the Hutu will never be comfortable. Figure 
out a way of killing them and finishing them.’46  A former commander of the Interahamwe, 
currently serving a life sentence in a Kigali prison, claimed when interviewed in 2015 that he 
was trained by French troops (along with 700 others drawn from the Kigali area), who taught 
him how to kill people with machetes and guns. The training lasted 8 months. At the time, he 
suspected that such training was to enable genocide of Tutsi.47 During the actual genocide, 
numerous witnesses and photographic evidence substantiate the fact that French soldiers 
directly assisted Rwandan army units48 and indeed an investigation by Human Rights Watch  
‘observed French soldiers manning checkpoints...They were armed with 5.56mm FAMAS 
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automatic rifles, as well as Wasp 58 assault rocket launchers and other infantry support 
weapons. Like Rwandan army troops, French troops demanded identification [cards] from 
passing civilians.’49 The aforementioned Interahamwe commander confirmed that after the 
killings began, his group was accompanied by four French jeeps with about 20 French 
soldiers. These French soldiers did nothing to stop the murders. “They could have stopped 
us, but they didn’t ” stated the commander.50 
 It should be pointed out that these developments coincided with Rwanda being Sub-
Saharan Africa’s third-largest importer of weapons in the two years prior to the genocide, 
quite a feat for one of the smallest countries in Africa with a land area of just 9,633 sq miles.51 
Human Rights Watch claim that although not the sole supplier, it was the French who 
delivered the decisive military supplies and telecommunications equipment to the regime in 
Rwanda that later played an integral role in the genocide.52 Given the very close relationship 
between Paris and the government in Kigali, as well as the strong French diplomatic presence 
in the country, it is inconceivable that France did not know was unfolding. Ex- Interahamwe 
have claimed that Paris’ longstanding relationship with the Rwandan regime explained the 
French role in the genocide. 
 
Operation Amaryllis 
Within hours of the death of President Juvenal Hayarimana in Kigali on the evening of 6th 
April 1994, civil war mutated into genocide in Rwanda, with roadblocks being established 
and pre-prepared lists of targets for murder being distributed. 53 As violence raged, the 
French government, in coordination with other countries launched Operation Amaryllis, an 
evacuation mission to remove all European citizens from Rwanda. The operation was active 
between 8-14 April 1994. It needs highlighting that the first evacuees from Rwanda by French 
forces were Madame Agathe Habyarimana, the widow of the President, and thirty members 
of her family. To this day, this group remain genocide suspects and stand accused of being 
responsible for crimes against humanity.54 As this is written, these individuals continue to 
enjoy the protection of the French state. In contrast, Tutsi members of staff at the French 
embassy were abandoned by the French, most being killed by the génocidaires.55   
 The Belgian Col. Luc Marchal who was second in command of UNAMIR told the BBC, 
and later confirmed to Le Monde (23 August 1995), that one of the French planes supposedly 
participating in the evacuation operation Amaryllis arrived at 0345 hours on 9 April with 
several boxes of ammunition. The boxes, about 5 tons, were unloaded and transported by 
FAR vehicles to Kanombe military camp near Kigali airport, where the Rwandese 
Presidential Guard was quartered. The French government denied this, saying that the planes 
carried only French military personnel and material for the evacuation. The Interahamwe 
leader recently interviewed in prison in Rwanda confirms that the French did deliver a large 
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quantity of weapons to Kigali by air in the days immediately following the assassination of 
President Habyarimana, many of which were thereafter distributed to Interahamwe 56 Only 
after this did the French soldiers present revert back to their role of evacuating Europeans out 
of Rwanda.57  
Deliveries of arms from France to the regime continued throughout the period of the 
genocide and indeed, one former member of the Interahamwe has stated that as a French 
shipment of arms was being unloaded from a French military plane at Goma airport, the 
French were assuring them ‘...you cannot be defeated because we support you’. The 
génocidaire adds that ‘Once we unloaded the planes we were issued with the weapons and 
boarded onto buses at Goma to be taken to Kigali or some other place’ to engage in the 
killings.58 
 On 17 May 1994, a United Nations arms embargo mandated a halt to all arms shipments 
to Rwanda.59 However, as late as 18 July 1994 arms originating from France were still being 
delivered to the Hutu regime, which was now in exile in Zaire, another client state of the 
French. These arms transfers were conducted under the guise of Operation Turquoise (see 
below).60 The sheer scale of French arms sales to Rwanda in the period immediately before  
and during the genocide played a major role in sustaining and escalating the violence. 61 The 
question of complicity clearly arises simply with reference to these weapons shipments.   
 
Ending a genocide 
By the end of May 1994, the RPF controlled most of eastern Rwanda and had put a halt to the 
genocide in this area. Human rights organisations and the media had by this time become 
aware of what had unfolded. Even the French Foreign Minister, Alain Juppé, was compelled 
to acknowledge that the events in Rwanda constituted ‘genocide’.62 That it was genocide 
committed by a close ally of Paris was elided. By this point in time, it was becoming evident 
that the RPF were close to toppling the regime in Kigali and achieving military victory. In full 
knowledge of these conditions, the French government put forward a resolution to the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for a self-funded ‘humanitarian intervention’ in 
Rwanda codenamed Operation Turquoise. Resolution 929 was authorised by the UNSC on 
June 22 1994, providing the French intervention with an aura of authenticity. The Operation 
was described by France as ‘a temporary multinational force’ to establish secure 
humanitarian areas and its deployment was limited to two months.63 
 Operation Turquoise was granted a Chapter VII mandate by the UNSC, which allowed 
the use of ‘all necessary means, including the use of force’. Repeated requests throughout the 
previous two months by the UNAMIR Force Commander Romeo Dallaire to have his 
Chapter VI mandate amended to a Chapter VII operation permitting the similar use of force 
were continually rejected by the UNSC as the genocide unfolded. Yet as soon as Paris 
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observed that its client regime was about to be removed, Paris sprang into action. In fact, 
Dallaire strenuously opposed the authorization of the second UN mandated mission, later 
stating that ‘I was concerned about there being two missions in one country with conflicting 
mandates but ultimately I knew the French were using a humanitarian cloak to intervene in 
the country for their own ends.’64 One former British Ambassador to Rwanda has later 
averred that ‘[t]he real blinder the French played was to get Security Council agreement to 
this [resolution 929]’.65  
There was in fact distinct apathy within the UNSC to Resolution 929, with five 
abstentions out of a total of fifteen council members. Few on the Security Council believed 
that France was motivated by strictly humanitarian concerns.66 The general opinion within 
the UNSC was that it was unimaginable that France had had ‘a crisis of conscience’ and much 
more believable that it was about to use the cover of the UN to protect French interests in 
Rwanda and save Hutu génocidaires from retribution ‘.67 One former British Cabinet member 
of 1994 has noted that ‘there were other reasons [for the intervention]…any humanitarian 
consequences of the deployment were purely a by-product’.68 Yet such actors facilitated the 
mission. 
The United Nations authorization of Resolution 929 raised much domestic cynicism 
within France, with newspapers printing scathing allegations about its government’s 
deliberate collaboration in the planning and implementation of the genocide in Rwanda. A 
front-page cartoon in one French newspaper showed French troops carrying medical supplies 
into Rwanda. Standing nearby on top of a box of arms and ammunition is an African firing an 
automatic weapon at other Africans. One of the French soldiers is pictured shouting to his 
comrades: ''The problem is that they're armed to the teeth.'' On the munitions box are the 
words ''Made in France''69. Early on, civil society within France (or at least parts of it) fully 
understood Paris’ role. 
 In addition to the French military, a few hundred troops from Senegal and Chad, and 
about forty from the Republic of Congo and Niger, supported Operation Turquoise. Dallaire 
argues that ‘this was solely to give it an aura of multilateralism, but it was far from this’.70 
Given the well-known workings of Françafrique, this is most likely an accurate statement and 
fits in fully with French practice since the days of independence. The day after UNSC 
Resolution 929 was passed the French military arrived in Rwanda, heavily armed with 
mortars, light and heavy machine guns, helicopters, fighter-bombers, ground attack planes, 
reconnaissance planes and more than one hundred armoured vehicles. However the Force 
Commander of UNAMIR noted that there were very few trucks and those trucks present had 
no lift capabilities such as would be required for a notional humanitarian intervention. This 
led him to believe that this was primarily a military intervention, despite the stipulation by 
the Security Council that the intervention was for humanitarian purposes only.71 
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One genocide survivor who was in hiding in Kigali at the time has stated that the 
Interahamwe militia, responsible for the majority of the atrocities, ‘gave the French a very 
warm welcome. There was much shouting and dancing in the street and French tricolours 
being waved around and the flags were hung even on the Rwandan Army military vehicles. 
The killers were shouting “Vive La France”’.72 If the Interahamwe believed that French troops 
had arrived to stop their activities, this is a strange response. In fact, rather than quashing the 
massacres and drawing a halt to genocide in Rwanda, the arrival of the French troops buoyed 
the spirits of the near-defeated génocidaires who now felt protected by the arrival of their long 
term ally and reinvigorated to complete their task of exterminating the few remaining Tutsi. 
Indeed the arrival of the French military in June 1994 actually facilitated further massacres to 
continue unchecked for an extra month. The ex-Interahamwe commander cited earlier stated 
that the French actively helped him escape to Zaire. This individual was later convicted of 
Category Two genocide crimes at Gacaca, as defined in the Organic Law 08/96 of August 30, 
1996, namely being a person whose criminal acts or whose acts of criminal participation place 
them among perpetrators, conspirators of accomplices of intentional homicide or of serious 
assault against the person causing death.   
 With the arrival of Operation Turquoise, the Force Commander of UNAMIR and 
members of FAR actually recognised many of the French soldiers and commanders as having 
previously been garrisoned in Rwanda with Operation Noroît. 73 This was confirmed by the 
subsequent French Parliamentary Commission report on Rwanda (1998), which conceded 
that the use of such troops 'without doubt created a source of ambiguity and encouraged 
mistrust and scepticism’. 74 
 Witnesses have testified that, contrary to their alleged humanitarian mandate, French 
soldiers involved in Operation Turquoise actively killed Tutsis trapped at the Interahamwe 
roadblocks.  Clementine Gatete, a Tutsi survivor of Kigali has stated that ‘yes, the French did 
genocide and they helped people who did genocide…During the genocide they would help 
the Interahamwe with the roadblocks and check the identity cards to try and catch Tutsi 
civilians’.75 One ex-FAR soldier who worked alongside members of the French intervention 
force has stated that, ‘I did not see French soldiers shooting openly, but when they captured 
Tutsi at roadblocks they would put them into their trucks and drive them to the barracks. The 
people caught on the roadblock were never seen again’.76 According to Didier Gasana, who 
joined the Interahamwe before the start of the genocide, Tutsi prisoners arrested by the French 
at roadblocks were killed and loaded into trucks by the militias and the bodies dumped in 
Lake Vert. He claims that six French soldiers provided a military escort for the trucks 
carrying the corpses of the Tutsi. 77 
 Evidence has also been obtained of soldiers deployed by Operation Turquoise torturing 
persons suspected of being RPF members (often merely being Tutsi “justified” such 
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suspicions). Interviewees, including a former soldier with the Rwandan army, and a former 
Mayor in Karama Commune, state that they saw the French soldiers arresting people at 
roadblocks during the genocide. ‘They tied them up and then beat them badly. They then 
took them by helicopter to Nyungwe forest and pushed them out of the choppers from the air 
[whilst they were still alive]’. 78 Indeed, Celestin Mutangana survived being tortured by the 
French and then being thrown from one of their helicopters. When interviewed he displayed 
visible scarring to his body.79 
 
Operation Turquoise in Bisesero 
By mid-June 1994 there were few Tutsi left to rescue in Rwanda, with the exception of a few 
scattered pockets of survivors principally in the mountain of Bisesero, Kibuye, Southern 
Province. Due to the sheer numbers of Tutsi resident there, genocidal massacres had begun at 
a slightly slower pace in Kibuye prefecture. However through time, Kibuye prefecture 
became a target, resulting in vast numbers of Tutsi from the neighbouring areas fleeing to the 
Bisesero Region for refuge. Here they strove to resist their attackers. The historical reputation 
of the residents of Bisesero region as a warrior people had no doubt attracted Tutsis seeking 
protection to flee into the region.  During the genocide, the Interahamwe  established a base at 
Gishyita, which was a twenty-minute drive from the Bisesero mountains. This gave them 
easy access to their prey. 80 The Tutsi people of Bisesero were poorly armed with one 
survivor, Emmanuel Masozera, stating that ‘at the start of the killings we only had a few 
machetes and clubs but the killers were armed with guns and grenades. We also had stones 
to throw that the women had collected. The women were really truly brave. We didn’t think 
it would last long’. 81 The Interahamwe hunted down the Tutsi on the mountainside each day, 
withdrawing in the late afternoon. The cycle would begin again relentlessly each day, every 
day. Those endeavouring to resist the genocide at Bisesero would seek cover in the 
undergrowth, waiting until the militia were close at hand, and thereafter attempt to 
overcome them. But the Tutsi of Bisesero were no competition for the well-armed and well-
fed Interahamwe .    
 Survivors of Bisesero indicate that by late June 1994, from the peak number of 65,000 
people hiding in Bisesero, only about 2,000 remained alive. Witnesses describe these 
emaciated survivors as suffering from untreated wounds and hiding in caves or within the 
densely wooded forests. It was only a matter of time before these last survivors would 
succumb. Then, resisters of Bisesero learned from one of their few working radios that French 
soldiers had in fact arrived in Kibuye Prefecture, with a UN mandate to stop the genocide. In 
the words of one survivor, they thought their prayers had been answered.82 
 On arrival in Kibuye Prefecture, the French military established roadblocks and a 
headquarters  post at Gishyita, a location that had coincidentally been used by thousands of 
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Interahamwe as a meeting place for their daily assaults against the Tutsis in hiding in the 
Bisesero mountains. Robert Hakizimana, Jean Inyumba and Fabien Gara, former members of 
the Interahamwe, claim that they manned the roadblocks established by Operation Turquoise 
alongside French soldiers, and it was a common occurrence for civilians to be killed at the 
roadblocks, including women and children, in the presence of the French soldiers.83 Another 
former Interahamwe has detailed how French soldiers watched as the local Interahamwe leaders 
briefed the militias before organising their day’s transportation into the ‘killing fields’ of the 
Bisesero mountains. 84 Other ex-FAR and former Interahamwe claim that the French soldiers 
handed them guns and grenades and whilst they would move up the mountains on foot, 
other militia members were transported in French military buses, trucks or jeeps. 85 Jean 
Inyumba reveals that once the génocidaires left the base at Gishyita, the French used military 
telescopes to monitor and direct the militia ‘working’ on the hillsides. 86 When the 
Interahamwe returned to Gishyita each evening from the mountains, those in command would 
meet with the French soldiers at the military centre to inform them of the events of the day in 
Bisesero. 87 
 On June 26 1994, several British journalists arrived in Kibuye and became aware of the 
situation  at Bisesero. One of these journalists, Sam Kiley, informed the French soldiers at 
Gishyita that he was aware of the continuing slaughter at Bisesero and of his intention to 
forward an article to his editor that evening, detailing how massacres were continuing in the 
region despite the arrival of Operation Turquoise  and the French.88 The following day, a 
member of the Interahamwe and a self-confessed killer was approached by French soldiers in 
Gishyita. He claims ‘[t]hey bought me a Primus [beer] and asked me to take them to 
Bisesero’.89 The French were escorted mid-afternoon onto Bisesero mountain by a group of 
Interahamwe who travelled in a separate vehicle from the thirty or so French soldiers. Some of 
the Interahamwe were disguised, wearing uniforms of the Red Cross. A survivor of Bisesero 
who watched their arrival has stated: 
“They had three cars, two of them [armoured personnel carriers] of French 
soldiers and the third car with the militia [Interahamwe] but it stopped a short 
distance away. We said ‘lets go there’ when the cars had separated and stopped. 
‘If they kill us they kill us’. Not long before they came, the Interahamwe had killed 
some of our people and they [the bodies] were near me. Three were dead but two 
were still hot. We went and picked them and took them to the French cars. One 
had been shot and two were dead by machetes. I talked to the French soldiers 
through the window of the car [APC’s] and asked what help they could be to us. 
They stayed in their cars. They said they needed to know how many of us were 
here and said to bring everyone down out of the forests and onto the road”90. 
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Another witness who survived the massacres at Bisesero told the author that they were so 
desperate, they were prepared to take the risk, despite seeing that the French had arrived 
accompanied by Interahamwe. Some of these militia were actually recognised as being 
responsible for massacres at Bisesero over the previous weeks. The survivors believed that 
they would be surely safe from the militia, as there were French helicopters circling above.  
Survivors of the genocide at Bisesero claimed that by using loudspeakers to hail people, ‘the 
French were instrumental in talking the people out of their places of hiding’: 
‘The French waited till we had done what they had asked and we were all out of 
hiding and gathered together on the road. They had started to look anxious. They 
just said “we cannot help you just now”. They said they didn’t have lorries and 
would have to leave, but promised they would come back soon. The French 
soldiers took the guns we had taken from the killers. We had eighteen guns but it 
did not matter because we had no ammunition and did not know how to work 
them. They must have thought we would be able to shoot our killers’ 91. 
 
Rapidly, the survivors of Bisesero realised that the French troops that had arrived in the area 
appeared to be utterly disinterested in their plight. On his return to Kibuye one of the 
Interahamwe militia, Gusto, a former teacher who had escorted the French onto the Bisesero 
mountain, informed his leaders of the numbers and location of the remaining surviving Tutsi 
on the hillsides, and plans were made to destroy the last of the resisters. He claims that ‘the 
French had no plans to save any of these Tutsi; our aims were the same – to kill the Tutsi. The 
French supported the mission of the Hutu’. 92 So it was that only hours after the arrival of the 
French at Bisesero, surviving Tutsis faced death at the hands of the Interahamwe whilst the 
French soldiers stood by.  
 Interestingly, Charles Uwinkindi, a survivor of Bisesero, claims that until they arrived 
in Bisesero, the French soldiers held to the line given from Paris that considered the Hutu to 
be the victims of genocide and not the Tutsi. However, having viewed the recently 
slaughtered bodies of Tutsi by the Interahamwe, some of the French soldiers quickly realised 
that it was the Hutu that were the perpetrators of the genocide. 93 Sergeant Diego, the French 
non-commissioned officer in charge of the convoy that assembled the survivors of Bisesero, 
had earlier been briefed by his superiors that the Hutu were the victims. On his return to 
base that evening, he filed a report on his afternoon’s findings and consulted his superiors 
within Operation Turquoise for direction. He fully expected to be returning to Bisesero at 
first light to evacuate those people (the Tutsi) who were clearly in mortal danger. Instead, he 
was prevented from taking such action by the direct orders of his superior officers. 94 Diego 
made numerous phone calls to Paris but was frustrated by the resistance of higher military 
and government officials, who, despite Turquoise’s alleged humanitarian mandate, seemed 
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determined to resist intervention. The French sergeant took the decision to disobey the 
orders of his commanders, and, in the company of the French journalist Patrick de Saint-
Exupéry, Diego departed camp in a convoy with his troops to return to Bisesero in an effort 
to evacuate the remaining survivors.  
 His efforts were frustrated however by the arrival of the head of the French special 
forces attached to Operation Turquoise, himself a veteran of Operation Noroît, who landed 
his helicopter on the road directly ahead of the convoy, thereby preventing their departure. 95 
It was two days later, on 30 June 1994, that Diego, accompanied by the same journalist and 
troops, once again disobeyed direct orders and returned to Bisesero where they found over 
one thousand people killed since their initial visit to the area some three days previously. 
Under pressure because of the presence of the media, their superior officers at base camp 
relented and steps were taken to rescue the few desperate survivors. 96 From this, one must 
acknowledge that all evidence suggests that had the French acted in a manner appropriate to 
their mandate, many more of the people of Bisesero would have survived between 27 – 30 
June 1994.  
Perhaps the negligence of Operation Turquoise at Bisesero is an extreme example, yet 
within the broader context of France’s role in Rwanda in 1994 it can be seen as indicative of 
the approach of a section of the upper echelons in the French government.   
 By early July, the RPF were on the brink of a military victory. Rwandan Hutus were 
fleeing in their thousands across borders into refugee camps within Tanzania and Zaire; the 
interim government of Rwanda fled into the Humanitarian Safe Zone (SZH) of Operation 
Turquoise where looting was freely taking place under the gaze of the French. A former RPF 
soldier indicated that some French soldiers were actively stealing cars in Rwanda, that were 
then being resold in Zaire.97 France promised the international community that it would 
arrest the architects of the genocide who had by now fled into the SZH, however, ‘striving 
…to keep open the possibility of future power-sharing negotiations, the French actually 
facilitated the safe passage to Zaire of the Hutu government, the army, and the militias’. 98 In 
fact, a former Interahamwe commander has claimed that the French began rearming the 
genocidaires once they arrived in Zaire, with the plan to return to Rwanda and restore the 
regime overthrown by the FPR.99 This would fit with the fact that one British eyewitness has 
stated that the French soldiers who arrived in Butare in July evacuated Colonel Bagosora, 
flying him to Zaire on July 2, 1994.100  Bagosora was well known to the French military, 
having been responsible for establishing the militia group in early 1992 that became known 
as Interahamwe, and has indeed been charged with being one of the primary architects of the 
genocide of Tutsi. Colonel Théoneste Bagosora has since been convicted of crimes of 
genocide at the International Criminal Tribunal Rwanda. 101  
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Operation Turquoise provides much scope for criticism of France. The stated 
humanitarian aims and objectives of the mission were barely fulfilled. Such was the need to 
remain credible in the eyes of France’s African allies, many of whom were longstanding 
dictators and tyrants, that much of the actions of Turquoise were in reality directed towards 
the prevention of an RPF victory. The context of uneven democratisation across the 
continent, in some cases replacing leaders who had been in power for decades, alongside the 
emergence of the United States as the sole superpower is extremely important to note. A 
confidential newsletter, reputed to be from French government circles, showed the cynical 
disregard with which some of the French military and political establishment viewed the 
ongoing genocide. The article entitled ‘Considerable political and geostrategic interests are hidden 
behind the Rwandese heap of corpses’, argues that Rwanda was key to the whole Great Lakes 
region and could not be ‘lost’ to Anglophone influences. The newsletter ends as follows:  
 
The region cannot be left in the hands of an English-speaking strongman [Paul 
Kagame] completely aligned to American views and interests. That is why, since 1990, 
France has supported the late President Juvénal Habyarimana in order to fight the RPF. 
It did not work out, so now the only choice left to us is to put back in the saddle the 
Zairian President Mobutu Sese Seko, the one man capable of standing up to Museveni’ 
[and Kagame]. 102  
 
Post-genocide French Rwandan relations 
Since 1994, Rwanda has repeatedly called for France to take responsibility for its role in the 
genocide. Kigali has been frustrated at every step. Indeed, in 2006 Rwanda broke diplomatic 
relations with France in response to the publication of a report by a French judge claiming 
that nine members of the RPF were responsible for the assassination of President 
Habyarimana, the event that sparked the genocide. Bruguière's claims have been provocative 
and heavily criticized by Le Figaro, Liberation, and other French newspapers. This criticism is 
owing to the sole evidence for Brugiere’s claim being based on the testimony of a former 
member of the RPF, who is now hostile to the government of Rwanda, and a French 
government official with an obscure role in Rwanda pre-genocide but with responsibility for 
President Mitterand’s wiretap department at the Elysee Palace.103    
 On August 5, 2008, a report was released by the Government of Rwanda that 
demonstrated the complicit role of France in the Rwandan genocide. The report was the 
culmination of three years of research by an independent commission, referred to earlier in 
this article as the Mucyo Commission. The report concluded that French government officials 
and the French military provided logistical support in 1994 to the interim Hutu government 
in Kigali. The most heinous charges included allegations that French soldiers raped Tutsi 
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women, participated in both genocidal killings and political assassinations, and that 
Operation Turquoise provided active support to permit the Hutu génocidaires to flee the 
advancing RPF, escaping to the then Zaire.  
 During a visit to Rwanda in 2010, President Sarkozy acknowledged that France had 
made ’a grave error of judgement‘ and ’displayed a kind of blindness’.104 But no apologies 
were made. This was followed in September of 2011, with President Kagame of Rwanda 
meeting President Sarkozy in Paris in an effort to bridge relations between their countries,105 
and the release of a new French investigation by ballistics experts commissioned by the 
French judge Marc Trevedic to identify the location from where the surface to air missiles 
were launched that struck Habyarimana’s jet. The publication of this ballistic report in 2012 
removed much of the force from the allegations of six years previously that the RPF were 
responsible for the launch of the missiles. 106 
 However, immediately prior to the commemorations marking the twentieth 
anniversary of the genocide in 2014, a deterioration in Franco-Rwandan relations occurred. 
The current tensions result from comments the Rwandan President Kagame made in an 
interview with Jeune Afrique in which he repeated his claim that France and Belgium had a 
direct role in the ’political preparation for the genocide and the perpetration of crimes of 
genocide’. 107 As a result of the comments made, France was not represented at the official 
genocide commemoration ceremony in Rwanda in April 2014.   
There are currently an estimated forty genocide suspects in France, more than in any 
other western country. These fugitives fled to France in the knowledge that they would be 
treated with impunity.108  Whitehouse claims that the reticence of France to pursue criminal 
proceedings is to avoid a focus on French foreign policy in Rwanda in the 1990s, which 
would reveal their complicity in the genocide. It is suggested there are currently twenty-eight 
on going investigations in France of Rwandan individuals suspected of crimes of genocide. 
One of those cases relates to that of Father Wenceslas Munyeshyaka who enjoys his own 
parish church in Gisors, France, and the safe haven France has provided for him since 2001. 
Father Wenceslas was indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in 
2005. The priest is accused of conspiring with leaders of the Interahamwe, writing up death 
lists, selecting Tutsi for extermination, being a willing bystander to Tutsis who had sought 
refuge within his church being removed and killed by Interahamwe and indeed there is 
substantial evidence that he raped young women throughout the period of the genocide. 
Refugees came to refer to Father Wenceslas Munyeshyaka as the ‘Chaplain of the Militia’. 
The indictment was passed to the French justice system in 2005 but to date there has been no 
justice for the victims of Father Wenceslas. He has been arrested several times, but on each 
occasion he has been released with no further action.109 This is but one example of French 
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reluctance to pursue justice for victims of the atrocities that took place in Rwanda, preferring 
instead to treat Rwandan fugitives in France with impunity.  
 
Conclusion 
Genocide does not occur without preparation, which includes ideological preparation in 
addition to practical, logistical and strategic efforts. Such preparation can be usefully 
described as conspiracy to commit genocide, which is a crime under international law in 
terms of Article III of the Genocide Convention. The ICTY has clearly indicated that any 
assistance in genocide constitutes sufficient participation to meet the terms of complicity as 
defined by the Genocide Convention. 
 This article has explored France’s political and military relationship with Rwanda from 
1990 and throughout the period of the genocide of 1994, highlighting the emergence of their 
complicity in genocide, revealing with special clarity that the French government overtly 
violated international law for political and economic advantage in central Africa. From 1990 
onwards, France performed an integral role in the nascent architecture of the Rwandan 
genocide. France colluded and conspired with the Hutu regime, and it supplied arms and 
military equipment, military training as well as the indoctrination of hate ideologies to the 
FAR and Hutu militia organisations. Once the genocide in Rwanda commenced in April 1994, 
France knowingly persisted in its collusive, participatory role by continuing to deliver arms 
and military training to the génocidaires throughout the period of Operation Turquoise. This 
was, as noted previously, in breach of a UN arms embargo.  
 The French motivation for the proposal of the humanitarian intervention in Rwanda is 
highly questionable and again suggestive of complicity in the on going genocide. The policy 
of a French intervention in Rwanda was only adopted once it became apparent to them that 
France’s chosen allies were on the point of being ousted by the RPF, viewed by the French as 
an ‘Anglo Saxon’ enemy. A victory by Paul Kagame was unpalatable to the French after its 
historically deep commitment to the Hutu regime. France was so fervid in its desire to block 
the RPF from halting the genocide and taking power in Rwanda that it pursued its role by 
deliberately and effectively forming a ‘humanitarian intervention’ as a cloak for the defence 
of its narrow state interests. As a by-product, the French intervention also facilitated the 
defeat of resistance in Bisesero, crushing the few remaining survivors on the mountainsides.  
The conduct of the French military at Gishyita is clearly definable as complicity in genocide 
and indicates that power interests rather than humanitarian concerns guided the French in 
Rwanda. It must be argued that there is potential for prosecution in terms under the concept 
of state crime.  
 While there has been some acceptance in the French Parliamentary report (1998) of 
French involvement in arming and equipping the government of Rwanda from 1990 – 1994, 
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there has never been an open discussion between the two countries or an apology from 
France. Complicity in genocide by external governments must be tackled by prosecution, 
thereby enforcing the international laws and conventions on genocide. In this sense, the 
government of France has questions to answer with regard to it being held accountable by 
their informed constituencies for their conspiratorial and complicit role in the genocide in 
Rwanda.   
 This article concludes that to gain a greater understanding of genocide, it is essential to 
illuminate the actions not only of the genocidal state, but also the actions of those 
governments external to the country of genocide, whose policies are driven by their own 
national interests. This is a crucial, if relatively under-analysed, set of issues in the field of 
genocide studies and intervention. Greater insight into these dynamics is an essential step 
towards the prevention of future genocide.  
In light of the evidence presented here, it is legitimate to question whether this atrocity 
could have been prevented if the government of France had expanded its national interests in 
Africa to include the welfare of ordinary Africans. It is only once criminologists and 
international jurists can begin to piece together all elements of the tragedy and instability in 
the Great Lakes Region that we will have a more realistic understanding of how international 
law might hold those responsible, through direct action or complicity, for one of the worst 
cases of genocide to blight human experience. Equally, such prosecutions—even of the 
“untouchables”—may make such actors think twice about their behaviour when similar 
tragedies occur in the future.  110 
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